The 2024–2025 U.S. Bombing Campaign Against Yemen’s Houthis: Strategic Objectives and Maritime Impacts

In late 2023, a new front in Yemen’s long-running conflict burst onto the international stage – not on the country’s battle-scarred plains, but in its surrounding seas. Yemen’s Houthi movement, entrenched in a fragile truce on land, opened a campaign of missile and drone attacks against shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These assaults, ostensibly to pressure Israel over the war in Gaza, threatened one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors. In response, the United States launched a sustained bombing campaign against Houthi targets in Yemen, marking a significant escalation of American military involvement. This analysis examines the most recent U.S. air offensive against the Houthis (spanning 2024 and into 2025), dissecting its operational execution, strategic military objectives, and the resulting effects on regional and global shipping routes. The study adopts a military studies perspective, evaluating the tactics employed, the capabilities and resilience of the Houthi forces, and the geopolitical reverberations of the campaign.

The analysis begins with background on the Houthi movement’s emergence as a regional threat beyond Yemen’s borders, particularly their actions in the Red Sea maritime domain. It then details the strategic importance of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, context necessary to understand why the U.S. and allies chose to intervene militarily. The core of the article provides an in-depth look at the U.S. bombing campaign: its phases, including initial strikes under Operation Poseidon Archer in early 2024 and an intensified offensive (informally referred to as Operation Rough Rider) in 2025. We will explore operational details such as the use of carrier-based airpower, cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, as well as the counter-measures and tactics of the Houthi forces (from coastal missile batteries to air defenses that have downed advanced drones). The effects of this conflict on maritime trade are analyzed, highlighting disruptions to shipping traffic, rerouting of vessels, and the broader economic implications. Finally, the analysis discusses geopolitical responses – from regional actors like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel, to global powers and international bodies – and reflects on what the campaign reveals about modern military strategy and security of global chokepoints.

Through this comprehensive examination, we seek to understand how an ostensibly localized conflict in Yemen has spilled over into the commons of international shipping, how the U.S. military has navigated the operational challenges of confronting a non-state actor equipped with advanced weaponry, and what the ongoing confrontation means for regional stability. The goal is to provide a detailed, academically rigorous account of the U.S. bombing campaign against the Houthis, situating the campaign in the broader context of military strategy and international security. The following sections break down these complex issues, drawing on operational reports and strategic analyses to offer insights into one of the most significant maritime security crises of the decade.

Background: The Houthi Movement and the Red Sea Conflict

Yemen’s Houthi Movement in Brief: The Houthi movement (officially known as Ansar Allah) arose from the mountainous north of Yemen and has been a major belligerent in Yemen’s civil war since 2014. By 2015, the Houthis controlled the capital, Sanaa, and large swathes of western Yemen, including significant portions of the Red Sea coastline. They fought a Saudi Arabia-led coalition backing Yemen’s internationally recognized government for years, enduring intense air bombardment and a blockade. A United Nations-brokered truce in April 2022 significantly reduced hostilities on the ground. Although that truce formally lapsed in late 2022, a de facto ceasefire largely held throughout 2023. By late 2023, Yemen saw its calmest period in years on the domestic front – but the Houthis remained heavily armed and politically aligned with Iran’s regional “Axis of Resistance.” This alignment would soon draw them into a new confrontation beyond Yemen’s borders.

Outbreak of the Red Sea Conflict (Late 2023): The trigger for the Houthis’ maritime campaign was the eruption of war between Israel and Palestinian factions in Gaza in October 2023. In solidarity with the Palestinians, the Houthi leadership declared their intent to pressure Israel and its allies. Starting on October 19, 2023, the Houthis launched long-range missiles and armed drones toward Israel. These projectiles traversed hundreds of kilometers over the Red Sea. In one notable incident, a U.S. Navy destroyer (on patrol to safeguard the area) intercepted multiple Houthi-fired missiles believed to be heading for Israeli territory. This demonstrated the Houthis’ newfound ability to strike far beyond Yemen. Simultaneously, the Houthis announced that the Red Sea would be a theater of war: any vessel deemed to have an Israeli connection would be a potential target. In practice, this “loose definition” of Israeli-linked shipping meant many international merchant ships became potential prey.

Through late 2023, the Houthis began targeting commercial shipping in the southern Red Sea and around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. They attacked vessels using a variety of methods: anti-ship cruise missiles launched from Yemen’s Red Sea coast, explosive-laden drones that could strike ships, and even the direct seizure of ships by force. For example, in November 2023, Houthi fighters seized a cargo ship named Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea. This vessel was Japanese-operated and British-owned, but critically, it was associated with an Israeli shipping firm. The Houthis boarded and captured the ship, holding its crew. While they treated the crew as hostages “in accordance with Islamic principles” by their account, the incident sent shockwaves through the shipping industry. It took intense international mediation – including intervention by Oman and pressure coinciding with a brief Gaza ceasefire – to secure the crew’s release weeks later. The Galaxy Leader incident underscored that the Houthis were willing and able to physically interdict ships, not just fire at them from afar.

Houthi Goals and Calculus: The Houthis proclaimed these attacks as retaliation for Israel’s actions in Gaza and as leverage to force an end to the Gaza conflict. The slogan of supporting Palestine was indeed popular domestically and across the region. By opening a front in the Red Sea, the Houthis also gained international attention, positioning themselves as part of the broader Iran-aligned resistance against Israel and the West. Analysts have debated whether the Houthis actively sought to draw the United States into a fight. Some experts, including former U.S. diplomats, argue that the Houthis anticipated a U.S. military reaction and even welcomed it, calculating that they could withstand American strikes and use them to galvanize Yemeni public support. Having resisted years of Saudi-led bombardment, the Houthis likely felt confident that limited U.S. strikes would not break their movement – and might even elevate their status as “resistance heroes” standing up to American aggression. In short, by late 2023 the Houthis were deliberately provoking a wider conflict, merging their local interests with regional geopolitical currents.

Initial International Response: Before resorting to direct force, the international community pursued diplomatic pressures. The United States and allied nations issued stern warnings throughout November and December 2023, demanding the Houthis halt attacks on shipping. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2722 in early January 2024, condemning the Houthi attacks on commercial vessels and affirming the principle of freedom of navigation. Notably, even usually cautious actors like Russia and China abstained rather than vetoing this resolution – signaling broad concern over the Houthi actions. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy and partner navies enhanced their presence in the Red Sea. A multinational maritime task force (Combined Task Force 153, under Operation Prosperity Guardian) was already in place to combat piracy and ensure security; it now shifted focus to escorting threatened shipping and deterring Houthi attacks. U.S., European, and regional naval vessels began accompanying some merchant ships or at least positioning nearby along major transit lanes. These steps, however, could not eliminate the risk across such a vast area. With each passing week, Houthi attacks increased in audacity. By the end of 2023, dozens of vessels of various flags had been harassed or attacked. The stage was set for a forceful American intervention as warnings alone failed to curtail the threat.

Strategic Importance of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb

The theater of this conflict – the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait – is of immense strategic significance. From a military studies perspective, it is a classic “chokepoint” in global commerce and a potential lever of geopolitical influence. Understanding why the U.S. and its allies reacted so decisively to secure these waterways requires grasping their economic and strategic weight.

Global Shipping Artery: The Red Sea connects the Indian Ocean (via the Bab el-Mandeb at its southern end) to the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal in the north. Together, the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez form a continuous maritime highway between Europe and Asia – one of the busiest trade routes in the world. Every year, thousands of vessels transit this corridor, carrying everything from Middle Eastern oil and gas to Asian manufactured goods and European grain. It is estimated that roughly 10% of global trade passes through the Red Sea. The energy flows are particularly critical: significant portions of Gulf oil bound for Europe and North America go via Red Sea/Suez, as do petroleum shipments from North Africa to Asia. Any disruption can have far-reaching economic ripple effects, raising shipping costs and commodity prices worldwide.

Bab el-Mandeb Strait: At the heart of the matter is the Bab el-Mandeb itself – a narrow strait between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa (Djibouti/Eritrea). At its narrowest point, this strait is only about 29 kilometers wide. It is a mandatory passage for ships entering or exiting the Red Sea to the south. Geostrategists classify Bab el-Mandeb as one of the world’s most critical chokepoints (alongside others like the Strait of Hormuz or Malacca). If Bab el-Mandeb were closed or deemed too dangerous, ships would have to divert around the Cape of Good Hope (the southern tip of Africa) – a detour of thousands of miles that is both time-consuming and expensive. During the Houthi campaign in late 2023, we saw echoes of this: hundreds of vessels, especially those operated by more cautious companies, began rerouting around Africa to avoid the Red Sea danger zone. This dramatically increases transit times (by over a week) and fuel costs, impacting global supply chains.

Military and Strategic Value: Control of or influence over Bab el-Mandeb is also a strategic prize in military terms. A hostile force menacing this strait can hold global trade hostage and gain leverage against more powerful adversaries. Regional powers throughout history have vied for influence here – from the Ottomans and British in the colonial era to modern states establishing naval bases. Indeed, in recent years, various countries have set up military facilities near the Bab el-Mandeb: for instance, the U.S., China, France, and others have bases in nearby Djibouti, underscoring its strategic location. For the Houthis (and by extension Iran, their key ally), being able to threaten Bab el-Mandeb was a way to poke at the economic lifelines of Western and Gulf nations without engaging them in a head-on conventional fight. It also complicates operations for any military coalition; navies must devote significant assets to patrols and escorts, and the risk of asymmetric attack (like a mine or a suicide drone boat) remains.

Economic Impact of the Houthi Attacks: By late 2023, the effect of Houthi attacks was palpable. Insurance premiums for ships entering the Red Sea spiked dramatically as underwriters reassessed the war risk. Many insurers started demanding warranties from shipping companies – for example, that vessels carry no Israeli cargo or have not visited Israeli ports – as a condition for coverage in the Red Sea. Some policies even excluded coverage if a vessel had U.S. or U.K. ownership stakes, reflecting the targeting of Western-linked assets. Major container shipping lines, which typically operate on tight schedules and margins, were among the first to pull back. By mid-December 2023, at least six of the world’s top ten container lines had largely ceased sending ships through the Suez–Red Sea route, opting for the long detour around Africa. In Israel, the port of Eilat on the Red Sea (Israel’s only Red Sea port, crucial for trade with Asia) saw an estimated 85% drop in traffic by late December – virtually a blockade by fear. Bulk cargo carriers and oil tankers were less able to reroute (due to their charter contracts and the need to deliver fuel supplies), so many still braved the passage, but often at reduced frequency. In effect, the Houthis’ actions were imposing an economic toll on global trade and pressuring multiple nations to address the security situation.

Freedom of Navigation and Legal Justifications: The brazen attacks on civilian shipping raised fundamental questions of freedom of navigation – a core principle of international maritime law. The Red Sea is an international waterway; interference with peaceful merchant traffic is a violation of international norms and potentially an act of piracy or unlawful warfare. The Houthis justified their actions as wartime measures against Israel and its supporters, but to most of the world, firing missiles at a commercial bulk carrier or hijacking a cargo ship is far outside lawful conduct. This context is crucial because it shaped the legal and moral justification for outside intervention. The U.S. and allies framed their impending strikes as necessary to uphold international law (protecting civilian vessels) and to ensure the stability of the global economy. When the United States began building a coalition to respond, even countries typically critical of U.S. interventions had to reckon with the fact that the Red Sea crisis was harming global interests. For instance, while Iran and a few others stood by the Houthis politically, many nations that might normally oppose Western military action found themselves quietly supportive of steps to restore maritime security.

In summary, the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb form a strategic crossroads where local conflicts can have outsize global impact. By late 2023, Houthi actions had made this clear. The world’s attention was now focused on this waterway, and the rationale for a U.S.-led military operation was not only to assist allies or punish the Houthis, but to safeguard a cornerstone of the international economic system. The following sections will describe how that operation unfolded and assess its success and consequences in light of the stakes outlined here.

Houthi Capabilities and Tactics in the Maritime Domain

To analyze the U.S. bombing campaign, one must first understand the capabilities of the adversary it targeted. The Houthi rebels, often underestimated as a non-state militia, have developed a surprisingly sophisticated arsenal and an adaptive range of tactics – particularly for maritime and long-range operations. Their military resources in 2024–2025 were a mix of repurposed old Yemeni military hardware, smuggled Iranian technology, and ingenuously modified weapons. Here we detail the key Houthi capabilities that enabled their campaign against shipping and how they employed these tools tactically.

Anti-Ship Missiles: Foremost among Houthi threats to shipping were anti-ship missiles. The Houthis had access to variants of cruise missiles likely derived from Iranian models (which in turn often trace back to Chinese or Soviet designs). During the conflict, at least a few attacks were confirmed to involve anti-ship cruise missiles. One notable case was the strike on the oil tanker Marlin Luanda in January 2024. This large Marshall Islands-flagged tanker was sailing off the coast of Yemen (approximately 110 km southeast of Aden) when it was hit by a missile. The projectile slammed into the ship’s starboard side, igniting a fire in its cargo of naphtha. The fact that the missile found its target in open water indicates a capable weapon system and targeting mechanism – likely coastal radar guiding a Noor/C-802 type cruise missile or similar. The Houthis have also displayed what they referred to as “ballistic anti-ship missiles.” U.S. intelligence assessed that in at least one U.S. strike (on January 16, 2024), the targets were four Houthi ballistic missiles fitted or intended for anti-ship roles. These could be modified short-range ballistic missiles (like Scud derivatives or the Iranian Qiam) adapted to aim at the general coordinates of maritime targets. While far less precise than cruise missiles, the mere threat of such ballistic missiles covering the Bab el-Mandeb creates a danger zone for ships, especially if fired in salvos.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Loitering Munitions: The Houthis are infamous for their use of drones. Over years of war, they have employed Iranian-supplied or locally-made UAVs for surveillance and attack. In the Red Sea conflict, they used long-range one-way attack drones (loitering munitions) to target both ships and potentially land targets (like bases or infrastructure of adversaries). These drones, often packed with explosives, can travel hundreds of kilometers. For instance, on more than one occasion, drones launched from Houthi-held Yemen flew north toward Israel. Some were intercepted by naval air defenses. The drones can also skim close to the sea surface to strike a vessel’s hull. Compared to missiles, drones are slower and carry smaller warheads, but they are harder to detect on radar and can swarm a target. A confirmed incident of such tactics was a Houthi drone attack on a cargo vessel True Confidence (a bulk carrier) in early 2024, which caused damage to its superstructure. The Houthis effectively pioneered tactics that resemble those used by Iran in the Persian Gulf – saturating defenses with a combination of missiles and drones approaching from different angles.

Fast Attack Craft and Explosive Boats: In addition to remote-fire weapons, the Houthis maintained a small “naval” capability using speedboats. Some of these boats were equipped with mounted machine guns or anti-tank guided missiles, enabling them to harass and potentially cripple commercial vessels at close range. More ominously, the Houthis have been known to deploy unmanned explosive boats in previous phases of the Yemen war (essentially remote-controlled suicide boats laden with explosives). While specific instances in 2023–2024 are not well-documented in open sources, coalition naval forces remained on guard for this threat. A fast boat packed with explosives can cause catastrophic damage to a tanker (as seen in past incidents like the attack on a Saudi frigate in 2017 attributed to the Houthis). Thus, coalition ships had to monitor for small craft moving at high speed near shipping lanes – a daunting task in busy waters.

Sea Mines: Sea mines are another asymmetric tool potentially at the Houthis’ disposal. Throughout the Yemen conflict, Houthi forces sporadically laid naval mines in the Red Sea, which on occasion broke loose and drifted, posing hazards. In the context of the Red Sea shipping campaign, mines were a feared threat – especially to vessels in the southern Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. Even a handful of moored mines could panic shipping firms. Fortunately, through end-2024, no major mining incidents were reported; possibly the Houthis did not heavily employ mines, or coalition mine-warfare efforts (patrols and minehunters) mitigated the risk. Nonetheless, navies treated the possibility seriously, and this further strained their resources.

Ballistic Missiles and Long-Range Rockets: Apart from specialized anti-ship munitions, the Houthis possess a large arsenal of ballistic missiles and rockets acquired from Yemeni stockpiles or built with Iranian assistance (such as the Burkan series, based on Scud technology). Some of these have ranges that cover not just all of Yemen but reach deep into Saudi Arabia or toward the Red Sea. During the period of conflict, the Houthis occasionally fired these at more distant targets. For example, they launched ballistic missiles northward at Israel; one such missile triggered air-raid alarms near Eilat and was intercepted. Another pair of missiles launched in May 2025 targeted central Israel (the Ramat David airbase and Tel Aviv area), both of which were intercepted by Israeli defense systems. These demonstrations illustrate the reach of Houthi missiles – effectively bringing Israel and potentially U.S. bases in the region within their range. While not directly part of maritime tactics, these missile strikes on Israel shaped the strategic environment, as they underscored the Houthis’ role in the wider Iran-Israel proxy conflict.

Air Defense Systems: A crucial, if underappreciated, facet of Houthi capability is air defense. By 2024, the Houthis had developed or acquired air defense weapons capable of threatening high-altitude aircraft and drones. They operated a mix of legacy Soviet-era systems (like SA-6 and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles from Yemen’s old arsenal) possibly modified with Iranian tech, as well as novel Iranian systems. The group even employed an Iranian-designed loitering SAM known as the “358” missile, designed to home in on UAVs and helicopters. During the U.S. campaign, Houthi air defenses proved unexpectedly effective against American unmanned aircraft. The Houthis claimed to have shot down numerous U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones patrolling Yemeni skies. While exact numbers are hard to verify, U.S. officials acknowledged at least several Reapers were lost. In fact, by the spring of 2025, Houthi sources boasted of downing around 16 Reapers since the Gaza war’s outset. They even attempted shots at U.S. fighter jets on occasion (for example, firing an SA-6 missile at an American F-16, which narrowly missed). This forced a significant tactical consideration for the U.S.: the airspace over parts of Yemen, especially around Sanaa and Saada (the Houthi heartland), was hazardous. American commanders had to assume that non-stealth aircraft flying at medium altitude could be at risk. This reality influenced the choice of weapons in the campaign – favoring standoff strikes (from beyond Houthi air-defense range) and stealthy platforms less susceptible to detection.

Command, Control, and Integration: The Houthis displayed a measure of command and control allowing them to coordinate these diverse systems. Their use of coastal radars (some possibly moved secretly along the coast) to target anti-ship missiles, communication networks to direct drone attacks, and ability to rapidly publicize their operations points to a semi-organized military structure. Iranian advisors or technology transfers likely played a part in training and equipping them for these complex tasks. By the time the U.S. strikes began, the Houthis had spent years fighting a technologically superior Saudi-led force, so they had learned to be agile – moving equipment frequently, using camouflage and decoys, and blending military assets into civilian areas. A clear illustration came when U.S. strikes hit a “General Command” military headquarters in Sanaa in 2025; the Houthis had not advertised the location of such command hubs, and they often place them near civilian infrastructure to deter attack. This adaptation posed challenges to U.S. targeteers aiming to neutralize Houthi capabilities without causing excessive collateral damage.

Tactics and Notable Incidents: Houthi tactics in late 2023 and early 2024 revolved around surprise and shock value. They declared a “naval siege” of Israeli-bound shipping and then proceeded to attack even neutral vessels, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty. Some key incidents illustrate their approach:

• Seizure of Hostages: The Galaxy Leader hijacking showed the willingness to capture a ship and hold crew as bargaining chips. They released the crew as a political gesture tied to a Gaza ceasefire, indicating they saw these actions as part of a political negotiation toolkit.

• Missile and Drone Swarms: On December 30, 2023, a significant attack targeted the merchant ship Maersk Hangzhou. The Houthis initially claimed it was linked to Israel; in reality it was a commercial container ship with no Israeli ties. The attack involved projectiles that damaged the vessel. This highlighted that the Houthis were broadening their target set, perhaps to sow fear and disruption broadly. Around the same period, U.S. Navy warships in the Red Sea intercepted a flurry of drones and missiles on multiple occasions. In one event, the destroyer USS Carney shot down several inbound drones and at least a couple of missiles within a single day – a testament to how intense the Houthi salvos were.

• Retaliation Against Warships: As mentioned in the Marlin Luanda case, when the USS Carney moved to assist the stricken tanker and its crew, the Houthis fired a missile at the U.S. Navy destroyer itself. This was the first known instance in this crisis of a direct Houthi attack on an American warship. Though the missile did not hit (the destroyer was not harmed, presumably due to defensive measures or the missile failing), it signaled that the Houthis would not shy from engaging even military targets if they came within range. This boldness forced U.S. ships to operate in a high-threat mode at all times.

• Targeting Infrastructure: The Houthis also threatened and possibly struck fixed infrastructure. They talked of targeting ports used by “the aggressors.” There were concerns they might fire on the Red Sea ports of neighboring countries or lay siege to the passage to the Suez Canal. In one instance in early 2024, they launched an attack on an Egyptian-managed cargo vessel MV Sounion, which resulted in explosions and eventually the partial sinking of that ship near the Yemeni coast. This raised alarm about potential environmental disaster (oil spill) and required a complex salvage operation. It was a reminder that a single successful attack can have both environmental and economic fallout.

In summary, the Houthi arsenal was diverse and dangerous. Their mix of guerrilla-style ingenuity and access to advanced weaponry (thanks largely to Iranian support) allowed a non-state group to pose a threat typically expected from a small national military. For U.S. planners, this meant the bombing campaign could not be a simple one-off strike at a static target set; it would be an ongoing suppression effort against a mobile, adaptive enemy. The Houthis’ capabilities also meant that the coalition had to prepare for potential casualties and setbacks – as seen by the loss of drones and the inherent risk to ships and aircraft operating in the area. The following section will delve into how the U.S. structured its response – in effect, how do you degrade such an enemy’s capabilities and protect a vast maritime area through an air campaign?

The U.S. Military Response: Objectives and Strategy

Confronted with the Houthi-initiated Red Sea crisis, the United States formulated a military response aimed at accomplishing several clear objectives. Strategically, the mission sought to (1) protect international shipping and ensure freedom of navigation through the Red Sea corridor, (2) deter the Houthis (and by extension, their Iranian backers) from continuing attacks by imposing military costs, and (3) reassure U.S. regional partners and allies (such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and global shipping nations) that the United States would act decisively to uphold security. Balancing these objectives required a carefully calibrated use of force – robust enough to neutralize threats, but measured to avoid unnecessary entanglement in Yemen’s broader civil conflict or excessive civilian harm.

From Warnings to Action – The Decision Process: By the end of 2023, American officials had exhausted diplomatic avenues to halt the Houthi attacks. An ultimatum issued on January 3, 2024, by the U.S. and a group of concerned nations had explicitly warned the Houthis to cease targeting ships or face consequences. When this was disregarded, President Joe Biden gave the order to initiate military strikes in early January 2024. Notably, Biden sought to assemble a degree of international participation or at least endorsement, to frame the response as a multilateral defense of international norms rather than a unilateral U.S. intervention. The United Kingdom quickly joined as an active partner in planning strikes, and other nations like France were consulted (though France ultimately declined direct involvement, reportedly due to concerns about further inflaming the region). Still, a coalition atmosphere was maintained: several allied countries (Australia, Canada, several European states, among others) provided support in forms such as naval assets for patrolling, intelligence sharing, and logistical help, even if they did not drop bombs themselves. This coalition approach mirrored past operations for protecting navigation (for instance, the 1987–88 Operation Earnest Will convoys in the Persian Gulf) but with a distinct difference: this coalition was willing to carry out preemptive strikes on land targets of the aggressor.

Operation “Poseidon Archer” (January 2024): The initial U.S.-UK strike campaign was codenamed Operation Poseidon Archer. Launched in the predawn hours of January 12, 2024, it represented a massive show of force intended to catch the Houthi military apparatus off guard and severely degrade its offensive potential. The concept of operations was akin to an opening air salvo in a conventional war: use overwhelming precision firepower to take out the enemy’s eyes, ears, and long-range claws (radar sites, communications nodes, missile launchers, drone facilities). American Central Command coordinated assets from multiple domains:

• Naval Strikes: As the operation kicked off, U.S. Navy vessels positioned in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden unleashed a barrage of Tomahawk cruise missiles. At least 80 Tomahawks were launched in the first wave from an array of platforms – including a guided missile cruiser and several destroyers in the Red Sea, as well as a U.S. Navy nuclear-powered submarine stationed in the region. The Tomahawks, with their 1,000+ km range and pinpoint accuracy, were aimed at fixed targets like command centers, air-defense installations, and known storage sites for missiles and drones. One of the first targets hit reportedly was a coastal radar and anti-ship missile battery site near Al-Salif in Hodeidah province, which was known to guide Houthi missile attacks on ships.

• Carrier-based Air Power: Concurrently, the U.S. Navy deployed carrier air wings to strike multiple Houthi targets. The aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, which had been redirected to the Red Sea area as the crisis grew, launched squadrons of F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters laden with precision-guided munitions. On the first night, around 20–25 carrier aircraft sorties were flown. These jets struck targets around Sanaa and in remote areas of northern Yemen (Saada and al-Jawf provinces) where the Houthis were believed to house missile launchers and drone workshops. The advantage of air-dropped munitions was the ability to hit moving or emergent targets – for instance, if real-time intelligence found a mobile missile launcher or a convoy transporting drones, the pilots could engage those.

• Regional Air Bases: The United States also utilized land-based aircraft from regional air bases (e.g., in the Gulf states or possibly Djibouti). U.S. Air Force strike fighters and bombers augmented the naval air strikes. Assets like F-15E Strike Eagles or F-16s, flying from bases in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere (with host nation permission), could have joined certain missions, carrying heavy payloads of guided bombs to saturate larger target complexes. The coordination of naval and air force strikes ensured that the Houthis were hit simultaneously across a broad swath of territory, from coastal Hodeidah to the highlands of Sanaa and the rugged mountains of Saada.

• British Participation: The UK’s role in Poseidon Archer, while more limited than the U.S., was symbolically and operationally significant. The Royal Air Force reportedly contributed a flight of combat aircraft (likely Eurofighter Typhoons or F-35B Lightning IIs) that joined in strikes on high-value targets like drone manufacturing facilities. Indeed, British involvement was confirmed when the UK Ministry of Defence stated that RAF jets struck a Houthi drone production site near Sanaa in coordination with U.S. forces. Additionally, the Royal Navy may have had a submarine in theatre that launched a small number of cruise missiles to support the opening barrage. Britain’s entry marked a rare UK return to kinetic operations in Yemen (a region of historical involvement), and it underscored the Western consensus on the need to curtail the Houthi threat.

Target Sets and Early Results: In that first 24–48 hours, well over 150 precision munitions rained down on Houthi positions. More than 60 distinct targets were hit in the initial night alone, followed by dozens more in subsequent waves. The strikes prioritized the following targets:

• Missile and Drone Launch Sites: Known launch locations (like makeshift pads or bases the Houthis had used to fire anti-ship missiles and long-range drones) were cratered by bombs. In one case, U.S. intelligence had pinpointed a cluster of anti-ship ballistic missiles in a remote desert location; these were destroyed in a follow-up strike on January 16.

• Weapons Storage and Manufacturing: The coalition struck warehouses and underground storage bunkers suspected of housing the stockpiles of missiles, explosives, and drone components. Some targets in and around Sanaa, including parts of a military airbase (al-Dailami Air Base) and industrial buildings, were believed to be involved in assembling or storing drones and missiles. These were hit with the aim of crippling the Houthi supply chain for new attacks.

• Radar and Air Defenses: To clear the way for continued air operations, early strikes took out Houthi radar installations (for example, one near the port of Hodeidah and another reportedly near the capital). Additionally, any active surface-to-air missile batteries that could be located were targeted. This was crucial to enable freedom of action for U.S. airpower in subsequent days.

• Command and Control Nodes: The U.S. attempted to decapitate or disorient the Houthi command structure by striking communications hubs. One such target, hit in the first wave, was a mountain-top communications relay in Amran governorate known as Jabal Aswad (“Black Mountain”), which the Houthis used for coordinating military units. The strikes there were said to be particularly intense, aiming to sever the links between Houthi leadership and field units.

After the first nights of Poseidon Archer, the U.S. military assessed that the Houthis’ capacity to mount large-scale attacks had been significantly blunted. U.S. Central Command noted that all intended targets were successfully struck. However, measuring success was tricky: the Houthis, for their part, admitted little. Houthi media either stayed silent on many strikes or claimed that only empty sites and civilian areas were hit. They did acknowledge some damage – for instance, losing some communication towers and military facilities – but maintained that their ability to retaliate remained intact. Indeed, within days, Houthi spokesman vowed to continue attacks and even broaden them if necessary. This indicated that the initial campaign, while tactically impressive, did not immediately cow the Houthi leadership into submission.

Rules of Engagement and Restraint: An important aspect of the U.S. strategy was an attempt to focus on military targets and avoid civilian casualties. This was not just a humanitarian concern but a strategic one: killing large numbers of civilians would hand the Houthis a propaganda victory and could erode international support for the mission. Thus, the U.S. reportedly forewarned or deliberately spared certain sensitive targets if they were deemed too intertwined with civilian life. Nevertheless, striking in urban areas like Sanaa came with risk. One of the U.S. missiles in January 2024 unfortunately hit near a residential district (due to either a miss or the target’s proximity to civilian structures), causing some collateral damage. This was seized upon by Houthi media, though overall civilian casualties in the first wave were relatively low by the standards of a large-scale bombardment. Washington emphasized that its strikes were “precision” and aimed purely at curtailing the specific threat to shipping.

Iranian and Regional Considerations: Strategically, the U.S. was also sending a message to Iran through this campaign. Iran’s support for the Houthis – via weapons, training, and political backing – was a known driver of the Houthis’ enhanced capabilities. By striking the Houthis decisively, the U.S. intended to signal to Tehran that actions threatening global trade and U.S. partners would bear consequences. American officials quietly conveyed to Iran (through backchannels) that the strikes were limited to stopping the maritime attacks, not an entry into the Yemen civil war per se. This was to dissuade Iran from escalating in response (for example, by instructing other proxies like Iraqi militias or Lebanese Hezbollah to attack U.S. interests elsewhere). President Biden even publicly stated that the U.S. had sent a “private message” to Iran about the Houthi issue. The subtext was clear: “we will hit your ally’s capabilities, but we do not seek a wider war if you likewise show restraint.”

Simultaneously, U.S. planners had to consider the stance of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the frontline states who had waged war against the Houthis previously. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were cautiously supportive of the U.S. campaign – it aligned with their interest in curbing Houthi power – but they were also wary. At the time, Saudi Arabia was engaged in delicate negotiations with the Houthis to transform the truce into a lasting peace, hoping to extricate itself from the Yemen quagmire. A massive U.S. onslaught on the Houthis could derail those talks if the Houthis lashed out at Saudi Arabia in anger or if Iran instructed them to reopen that front. Thus, Saudi Arabia publicly endorsed defending maritime security but did not join the strikes directly, seeking to keep its separate peace track alive. The U.S. had to ensure that its operations did not inadvertently push the Houthis to resume missile strikes into Saudi cities, which could reignite a broader war. For the first few weeks, this delicate balance held – the Houthis directed their ire toward the U.S. and Israel, not Saudi Arabia.

In summary, the U.S. response, as initially conceived under President Biden, was a robust but carefully contained operation: heavy blows to Houthi military assets focused on the maritime threat, combined with international diplomatic framing and measured communication to avoid a spiral into a larger Iran-U.S. confrontation or a collapse of the Yemen ceasefire on other fronts. The next section will examine how this campaign unfolded operationally over time – including both its successes and the challenges that emerged as the Houthis adapted to the onslaught.

Operational Details of the Bombing Campaign

The U.S. bombing campaign against the Houthis evolved over several phases, stretching from the initial onslaught in January 2024 into a protracted series of strikes throughout 2024, and then intensifying again in 2025. In operational terms, this was not a single continuous bombardment but a responsive campaign with ebbs and flows, reacting to Houthi actions. This section provides a detailed look at how the campaign was conducted: the assets involved, key missions and tactics, and notable shifts in strategy as the situation developed.

Initial Phase (January–February 2024): After the first waves of Operation Poseidon Archer in mid-January, U.S. and UK forces maintained a high operational tempo for the remainder of that month. Satellites, drones, and other surveillance means (such as signals intelligence and possibly informants on the ground) were used to locate any surviving Houthi launch capabilities. Whenever actionable intelligence emerged – for instance, if a specific cave or wadi was identified as hiding mobile missile launchers or if drones were observed being moved – follow-up airstrikes were executed. U.S. Central Command instituted an almost 24/7 “air watch” over critical areas. MQ-9 Reaper drones orbited above known Houthi missile hotspots (albeit at high altitudes or offset distances to reduce their vulnerability to air defenses). Navy P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft scoured the sea lanes and coastline for suspicious vessels or new mortar positions that might threaten ships.

On January 13, a day after the initial barrage, the destroyer USS Carney conducted a “follow-on” Tomahawk strike to eliminate a Houthi radar installation near Sanaa (as earlier noted). This indicated the campaign’s dynamic nature: naval vessels on station could quickly launch missiles at time-sensitive targets relayed by intelligence. By mid-January, U.S. officials claimed that most known anti-ship missile sites had been hit. President Biden publicly commented around January 19 that the strikes had “not stopped the Red Sea attacks completely” – a candid admission that, despite the ferocity of Poseidon Archer, the Houthis had managed some continued attacks (like the Marlin Luanda incident on Jan 25). However, U.S. defense officials pointed out that without the strikes, the scale and frequency of Houthi attacks would likely have been far greater.

One noteworthy operational engagement was the defense of the Marlin Luanda tanker and subsequent actions on January 25–27, 2024. After the tanker was struck and caught fire, the U.S. Navy, along with French and Indian warships, coordinated a successful firefighting and escort mission. The USS Carney and the French frigate Alsace moved in to assist the tanker’s mainly Indian crew, while the Indian Navy sent specialists aboard to help control the blaze. During this rescue operation, coalition ships remained on high alert for further Houthi attacks – and indeed had to contend with the attempted missile strike on Carney. The interoperability shown in this event (U.S., French, and Indian navies working together) was an operational success in terms of crisis response and may have saved the ship from sinking. It also signaled to the Houthis that even after their initial shock, the international community was not backing out of the Red Sea; rather, naval presence was increasing.

By February 2024, Houthi capabilities for large-scale attacks had been significantly attrited, but not entirely eliminated. The Houthis demonstrated resilience: on February 2, a merchant vessel Rubymar was hit by an explosion (likely a mine or drone) off Yemen’s coast and eventually sank. This incident, coming weeks after the U.S. strikes, showed that the Houthis still had means to inflict damage. It is possible this was a delayed effect – maybe a drifting mine from earlier – but it kept tensions high. The U.S. military had to plan for a sustained campaign instead of a quick one-off punitive strike.

Continued Operations and a Shifting Battlefield (March–August 2024): In the months following the initial phase, the conflict entered a cat-and-mouse stage. The Houthis, under pressure, reduced the frequency of major attacks on shipping for a time, especially as the war in Gaza wound down in early 2024 (with a ceasefire coming into effect). However, they did not cease completely. Instead, they appeared to recalibrate: focusing on selective targets and occasionally testing the waters with sporadic attacks. For example, in March 2024, the Houthis attempted an attack on another commercial vessel (Keoyoung Sun, a South Korean-owned freighter) and also reportedly fired at a coalition warship – a Russian naval vessel (Sergey Kotov) patrolling in the Red Sea. (Russia, having interests in maintaining Red Sea security for its own shipping, had dispatched a patrol ship; an attack on it, if confirmed, would illustrate how indiscriminate the threat had become.)

During this period, U.S. forces maintained a deterrent posture. The USS Eisenhower carrier strike group remained in the region for extended time, rather than rotating out, in order to provide continuous air cover. Additionally, another U.S. carrier (the USS Gerald R. Ford) was kept in the broader Middle East theatre as backup, reflecting the U.S. Navy’s flexible response to simultaneous crises (the tail end of the Israel-Hamas war and the Yemen front). Air strikes on Yemen became intermittent but still occurred whenever necessary. In late March, after a Houthi drone targeted an Israeli-owned cargo ship (the Koi, which fortunately evaded damage), U.S. aircraft struck the launch site of that drone in Houthi territory within hours. This quick reaction was made possible by improved intelligence—likely the integration of real-time drone surveillance and possibly signals intercepts that traced the control signals back to their source.

A significant development in mid-2024 was the growing involvement of Israel. Although Israel had initially held off direct retaliation (deferring to the U.S.-led effort and perhaps to avoid widening its war while Gaza was active), by the summer of 2024 the dynamic changed. The Houthis, seemingly not sufficiently deterred, carried out a high-profile drone attack on Israel in June 2024, managing to send a long-range drone that reached near Tel Aviv (though it caused minimal damage, its mere arrival had psychological and political impact). In response, on July 20, 2024, Israel reportedly conducted its own airstrike on a Houthi target in Yemen – likely a one-off precision strike aimed at a specific missile depot or launch crew responsible for the Tel Aviv drone. This marked Israel’s first known direct strike in Yemen. It was followed by another series of Israeli strikes in late September 2024, after the Houthis attempted further launches (including possibly at Israel’s port of Eilat). These Israeli operations, while limited, meant that by late 2024 the Houthis were facing air attacks from multiple fronts – the U.S., UK, and Israel – adding to the pressure on their military infrastructure.

From an operational standpoint, coordinating multi-nation strikes can be complex. However, it appears there was de-confliction in place: the U.S. likely was aware of Israeli plans and perhaps even shared targeting intelligence. Israel’s strikes were carefully timed and did not conflict with ongoing U.S. missions. The additive effect was further degradation of Houthi capabilities, albeit with the risk of pushing the Houthis to become even more desperate or reckless.

Use of Stealth and Specialized Assets: One of the noteworthy operational enhancements in the latter half of 2024 was the deployment of U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bombers to the theater. In October 2024, the Pentagon announced that B-2s had struck Houthi targets, specifically five underground bunkers storing weapons used for attacking ships. The B-2s flew from a base at Diego Garcia (as evidenced by satellite photos showing multiple B-2s there) and possibly used the newly refurbished airstrip on Mayun (Perim) Island near Bab el-Mandeb as a contingency landing or support base. The B-2 strikes were a tactical choice to penetrate heavily defended or sensitive areas without alerting Houthi air defenses. Equipped with bunker-busting munitions (like the GBU-28 or GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator), the B-2s destroyed fortified storage sites that cruise missiles or fighters might not easily neutralize. These bunkers likely held stockpiles of anti-ship cruise missiles or ballistic missiles that intelligence uncovered over time. The success of these strikes was signaled by U.S. officials as a strong warning – in the words of the Pentagon press secretary at the time: “We struck exactly what we intended… sending a message that there will be consequences for illegal and reckless attacks on shipping.” The B-2 deployment also underscored the seriousness of the ongoing campaign; such a high-value asset is only used when significant threats remain that require its unique capabilities.

Houthi Adaptation: As the campaign wore on, the Houthis adapted in several ways operationally. They increasingly dispersed their assets and intermingled them with civilian infrastructure. For instance, after losing obvious large sites, they moved drone assembly into smaller workshops hidden in urban neighborhoods. They also relied more on mobility – using camouflaged trucks to transport missile launchers that could shoot and then relocate before being struck. Their communications shifted to hardened or redundant networks (some reports indicated they began using fiber-optic landlines and buried cables to avoid electronic intercept). The net effect was that by late 2024, finding targetable Houthi assets became more challenging. U.S. and allied strikes thus became more intelligence-driven and occasional, rather than the heavy nightly bombardments of January. In military terms, the conflict resembled a suppression of enemy capabilities (similar to countering Scud launchers in the Gulf War) combined with an ongoing deterrence operation.

Casualty and Damage Assessment: It’s important to note that throughout 2024, while the U.S. claimed success in hitting targets, the Houthis downplayed their losses. By their own accounting, the strikes up to late 2024 had killed relatively few Houthi fighters (they would often cite figures like 50 or 60 killed, a number far lower than what one might expect given the scale of bombardment). Independent verification was hard due to lack of access. It’s plausible that Houthi actual losses were higher, but that they deliberately concealed or minimized them to maintain morale and avoid the appearance of weakness. They certainly lost material: Western intelligence observed significant depletion of Houthi missile inventories and destruction of key facilities. However, the Houthis were still able to operate, indicating that enough of their capacity survived or was replaceable (through new smuggling of parts from Iran, for example).

By the end of 2024, the U.S. and UK portion of the campaign had reportedly conducted nearly a thousand airstrikes in total. This figure likely counts each individual strike sortie or missile as a “strike,” but it emphasizes the sustained nature of the effort. Such a protracted air operation with few if any U.S. personnel casualties (since no ground troops were involved and aircrews did not come under fire successfully) was unusual – it was akin to a low-level air war largely kept out of the headlines due to the absence of American fatalities. However, it had heavy impacts on the ground in Yemen and on Houthi military strength.

Escalation in 2025 – Operation “Rough Rider”: A major shift occurred with the change of U.S. administration in January 2025. President Donald Trump, returning to office, inherited the Yemen campaign and chose to escalate it when provoked by renewed Houthi aggression. As mentioned earlier, after several months of relative lull coinciding with the Gaza ceasefire, the Houthis ramped up attacks again in March 2025. They did so citing grievances such as Israel’s blocking of aid to Gaza, and they explicitly threatened to once more target “Israeli” (broadly interpreted) ships if their demands were not met. True to their word, around March 12, they launched new attacks on shipping. In one week, multiple ships reported drone or missile incidents – though none were sunk, the psychological effect was similar to late 2023, with insurance premiums spiking again and more ships avoiding the Red Sea.

President Trump, just two months into his term, authorized a fresh and intensive air campaign starting March 15, 2025. This new phase was internally dubbed Operation Rough Rider. In contrast to the measured approach earlier, Rough Rider took a more aggressive stance: not only targeting hardware but also attempting to strike Houthi leadership and command structures. Over the next six weeks, U.S. forces hit over a thousand targets across Houthi-controlled Yemen – an expansion in scale that implied a broader target list (including repeat hits on some targets as well as new ones). According to U.S. military briefings, Rough Rider aimed to “kill Houthi fighters and leaders, including senior missile and UAV officials, and degrade their capabilities.” The lack of emphasis on avoiding Houthi personnel casualties was notable; it suggested a realization that as long as the Houthi fighters and commanders remained intact, they would keep finding ways to threaten shipping.

Operationally, Rough Rider saw the continued use of carriers and cruise missiles, but with even more firepower deployed. For example, the U.S. Air Force was more heavily engaged alongside the Navy. B-52 Stratofortress bombers were reportedly used to carpet targeted encampments of Houthi fighters in remote areas, a tactic seldom seen in the earlier phase. The U.S. also began striking targets in central Sanaa that it had avoided before due to proximity to civilians. In mid-April 2025, a U.S. strike hit the compound of the Yemeni military’s former general command in downtown Sanaa, which by then served as a de facto Houthi headquarters. The strike flattened parts of the complex; Houthi authorities did not disclose casualties from that, but it likely eliminated personnel. Similarly, multiple strikes hit the telecommunications ministry building (which the U.S. alleged was doubling as a communications hub for the Houthi military), knocking out Houthi media broadcast capabilities for a time.

Controversial Strikes and Civilian Impact: The intensification of Rough Rider led to some of the war’s worst civilian casualty incidents, ironically inflicted not by the Houthis but by the U.S. campaign. On April 18, 2025, a U.S. airstrike targeted the Ras Isa oil terminal at the port of al-Salif in Hodeidah province. The intelligence rationale was that the Houthis might have been using the port facility to import fuel and possibly as a site to assemble or load explosive drones on boats. The strike, however, hit fuel storage tanks and port infrastructure and ignited a massive conflagration. Unbeknownst to targeteers, a large gathering of people – workers and possibly others seeking fuel – were present. The resulting explosions and fire killed at least 80 people and wounded about 150. It was one of the deadliest U.S. attacks in Yemen’s history in terms of immediate death toll. Images of flames towering from the port were broadcast on Houthi media, galvanizing anger not just among Houthis but even neutral Yemeni civilians who suffered fuel shortages as a result.

Just ten days later, on April 28, another tragic mistake occurred: a U.S. strike hit a detention center in Saada province that was housing African migrants. This facility was apparently misidentified or mistakenly struck while targeting what was believed to be a Houthi military site. The blast killed an estimated 68 migrants and guards. This caused international outrage and put the U.S. on the defensive, with human rights organizations condemning the lack of precautions. U.S. Central Command expressed “regret” for civilian deaths, but these incidents stained the campaign’s image and raised questions about the efficacy of an intensified approach.

From an operational standpoint, such incidents often stem from faulty or stale intelligence and the fog of war. As the Houthis became harder to pinpoint militarily, the U.S. expanded its target set to include infrastructure and logistical nodes that, if disrupted, would indirectly hurt the Houthi war effort (for instance, hitting an oil facility to strain their fuel supply). But these kinds of targets sit at the blurry edge of military and civilian use, making collateral damage more likely. The high tempo of strikes under Rough Rider may have also strained the vetting process that earlier was more deliberate, leading to errors.

Houthi Countermoves (2025): Despite the heavy blows of Rough Rider, the Houthis remained defiant. They continued to launch occasional missiles – notably the pair of long-range ballistic missiles launched at Israel in early May 2025, right after the Ras Isa port was hit again by U.S. strikes. Those missiles were intercepted, but they demonstrated the Houthis’ continued ability to strike back symbolically. The Houthis also claimed to have shot down more U.S. drones during this period; indeed, Fox News reported by April 2025 that at least three Reapers were downed in just a few weeks of March/April, as the Houthis concentrated their air defense efforts. This forced U.S. manned aircraft to fly higher or rely on stand-off weapons rather than low-flying close air support.

As Rough Rider went on, the U.S. Navy kept two carrier strike groups in the region for redundancy – an expensive but telling commitment. There was a sense that the Houthis might be trying to “weather the storm” until international or domestic U.S. political pressure forced a halt to the strikes. In effect, both sides were testing each other’s endurance at this stage.

Logistics and Sustainment: Running an air war of this magnitude required extensive logistics. Aerial refueling tankers flew daily to keep jets airborne from distant bases. Munitions stockpiles had to be drawn down; the U.S. reportedly spent over $1 billion on this operation in just six weeks (mid-March to end of April 2025). This included the cost of precision missiles, aircraft carrier operating costs, hazard pay, and so on. Meanwhile, maintenance crews labored to keep aircraft ready for repeated sorties in desert conditions. Partner nations like Saudi Arabia quietly offered logistical help (e.g., allowing U.S. aircraft to use Saudi airspace or even airports for emergency landings, and possibly sharing some spare parts or fuel from their stocks).

Summary of Operational Effectiveness: By mid-2025, militarily, the U.S. campaign had achieved a large measure of its direct goal: Houthi attacks on shipping had been sharply reduced from their initial peak, and the Houthis’ arsenal was much diminished. The Red Sea was not entirely safe – occasional attacks still happened – but the all-out assault on vessels seen in late 2023 was curtailed. However, this came at the cost of a heavy bombardment that undoubtedly strained Yemeni infrastructure and caused civilian suffering. In operational terms, the U.S. demonstrated it could project sustained power to suppress a regional threat, but it also highlighted the limits of air power in completely neutralizing a determined guerilla-force with popular support. The Houthis were battered yet unbroken – they could still fire a missile or drone now and then, meaning even total air supremacy did not equate to total denial of enemy action. This cat-and-mouse pattern is reminiscent of other air campaigns against insurgents or militias (for example, NATO’s strikes in Libya in 2011, or Israeli strikes against Hezbollah in 2006) where the adversary, though outmatched, survives to claim a form of victory by mere endurance.

Having dissected the operational conduct of the U.S. bombing campaign, we now turn to its broader consequences. How did this military effort impact the shipping routes it was meant to protect, and what have been the wider geopolitical ripple effects? These questions will be examined in the subsequent sections.

Impact on Regional and Global Shipping Routes

One of the clearest metrics of success (or failure) for the U.S. campaign is its effect on the security and openness of maritime trade routes in the region. The Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as discussed, are critical waterways – so how did the conflict and subsequent U.S. intervention alter shipping patterns, risk assessments, and economic outcomes? This section evaluates the short-term and longer-term impacts on shipping, from the height of the Houthi attacks through the period of U.S. strikes and beyond.

Short-Term Disruption (Late 2023 – Early 2024): When the Houthi “naval siege” began in late 2023, the impact was immediate and dramatic. Many shipping companies, faced with the real-time specter of missiles and drones, took swift action to protect their vessels and crews. In practical terms, by November 2023 a growing list of maritime firms instructed their ships to avoid the Red Sea route if at all possible. Vessels already in the Red Sea often rushed to exit, in convoys if they could arrange them. Marine insurers declared the entire Red Sea and Gulf of Aden a high-risk war zone, triggering special premiums. As noted, container lines especially re-routed around the Cape of Good Hope. This added roughly 8-10 days of transit between Europe and Asia on average, which for container schedules meant missed connections and disarray in global supply chains. The cost implications were significant: a single large container ship going around Africa can incur hundreds of thousands of dollars in extra fuel costs and crew time. Multiply that by dozens of voyages, and costs soared – inevitably passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for transported goods.

The attacks also caused localized shipping incidents that had costly consequences. For example, when the Marlin Luanda tanker was hit and caught fire in January 2024, it temporarily raised the specter of an environmental disaster. Had the fire not been controlled, the ship could have spilled tens of thousands of tons of oil into the Gulf of Aden, decimating marine ecosystems and shutting down shipping in the area for cleanup. Thankfully, that worst-case was averted. Similarly, the sinking of the Rubymar in February created a wreck in coastal waters that salvage teams had to address, and it spilled fuel oil (albeit not on the scale of an oil tanker, since Rubymar was a smaller cargo vessel). Egyptian authorities grew concerned about the risk to the Suez Canal if a stricken vessel or mines might drift northwards.

Effect of U.S. Intervention on Shipping Confidence: When the U.S. and allies intervened militarily in January 2024, there was a notable, if gradual, restoration of confidence among some shipping operators. The presence of American and allied warships actively patrolling and escorting gave commercial shippers a measure of reassurance that if attacked, help was nearby. Some shipping companies resumed limited Red Sea transits by February 2024, especially those carrying critical bulk goods that were hard to reroute. Insurance companies responded to the U.S. action by slightly lowering premiums or offering more availability of war-risk insurance, on the logic that the threat level was being actively managed by a superpower-led effort.

However, this confidence was cautious and contingent on continued suppression of Houthi activity. When any Houthi attack did slip through (like the incidents in late January), it reminded everyone that the risk was still present. As a result, many companies took a wait-and-see approach. It wasn’t until several weeks of relative calm passed (in the wake of the initial U.S. strikes) that a more substantial number of ships began returning to the route. By April 2024, maritime traffic data indicated that daily vessel counts in the Red Sea were gradually rising again, though still below pre-crisis averages. Particularly, oil tankers and bulk carriers (carrying commodities like grain, coal, iron ore) resumed near-normal operations, since alternative routes were so inefficient for them. Container ships were slower to return; several major lines effectively wrote off the Red Sea route for the first half of 2024, focusing instead on alternate logistics and even exploring overland rail across Asia or use of other regional ports (some cargo bound for Israel or Jordan was offloaded in the UAE or Oman and shipped overland to avoid Red Sea transit at the height of the crisis).

Bab el-Mandeb Traffic Patterns: The Bab el-Mandeb Strait itself became a choke point not just in the figurative sense, but literally in terms of traffic management. Allied naval forces established a more formal convoy or guarded passage system for Bab el-Mandeb by early 2024. For instance, warships from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) – which include U.S., European, and regional navies – would sweep the strait each morning and then shepherd a group of merchant vessels through the narrowest part. Some convoys were accompanied by helicopter overflights from Djibouti or from ships, scanning for fast boat threats or mines. This hearkened back to World War II-era convoy duty, albeit with modern tech. The result was that no ships were attacked right at the chokepoint while under escort. Still, the strait’s southern approach remained dangerous; the Houthis attempted to hit ships as they entered or left the Red Sea rather than exactly at the escorted moment.

Eilat and Alternative Routes: The virtual blockade of Eilat (Israel’s Red Sea port) continued until the Gaza war paused. Once that war reached a ceasefire, the Houthis had less political justification to single out Israel-bound trade, and Eilat saw a modest uptick again in mid-2024. But Israeli importers/exporters had by then shifted much of their shipping back to the Mediterranean ports or using land routes from Jordan. The episode underlined Israel’s vulnerability of having only one small outlet to the Indian Ocean that could be easily threatened by hostile forces in Yemen or even Sudan.

A notable alternative that was utilized more during the crisis was the Arab Petroleum Pipeline (SUMED) that runs from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean in Egypt. This pipeline can tranship oil, bypassing the Suez Canal for part of the journey. In late 2023, some Gulf oil intended for Europe was offloaded at Red Sea terminals in Saudi Arabia and transported via SUMED to the Med, then reloaded onto tankers, just to avoid Bab el-Mandeb. This is less efficient than a continuous sea voyage, but it demonstrated the lengths to which companies and countries went to mitigate risk. The existence of alternative pipelines (like Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea) was somewhat helpful, but since the Red Sea itself was a danger zone, pumping oil to a Red Sea port still left tankers in harm’s way. Some industry voices called for reviving stalled pipeline projects that bypass chokepoints (for example, a pipeline from the UAE to the Mediterranean through Saudi or Israel). These were long-term ideas not immediately helpful but reflect how the crisis reignited interest in route diversification.

Economic Costs and Shipping Industry Response: Economically, the disruption added insurance and rerouting costs estimated in the billions of dollars over the span of late 2023 to early 2024. The price of crude oil saw volatility; at one point in December 2023, oil prices ticked upward as traders feared a potential closure of Bab el-Mandeb. However, once U.S. strikes began and it became clear flows would continue (even if along longer routes), the market stabilized somewhat. The shipping industry lobbied governments to ensure naval protection – a rare instance where commercial shippers openly pleaded for military escorts in peacetime. Organizations like the International Maritime Organization (IMO) held emergency sessions on the Red Sea crisis, issuing navigational warnings and coordinating information-sharing about threats (like broadcasting via the World-Wide Navigational Warning Service when a Houthi attack was ongoing, so ships could take evasive action).

There were also human costs: crew fatigue and stress increased on voyages that took the long route or had to operate in high alert through war zones. Some crews refused to sail certain routes unless additional hazard pay was provided. One could argue that the Houthis, with minimal expenditure (drones and missiles are cheap relative to the impact), managed to impose broad costs and risks on the maritime domain – a classic asymmetric success.

Effects of the 2025 Escalation: When the Houthis resumed attacks in March 2025 and the U.S. launched Operation Rough Rider, the cycle to some extent repeated. Ships once again diverted or delayed transits, fearing an upsurge of attacks. However, by this time many shipping companies had contingency plans and a better understanding of the threat. Moreover, the U.S. had pre-positioned more assets, and allied naval presence was strong. As a result, the second round of disruption, while serious, was managed more efficiently. The turnaround from increased threat to increased countermeasures was faster. War-risk insurance rates, which had started to drop by late 2024, spiked again in March 2025 but were somewhat normalized by May after a month of no major successful Houthi strikes on ships.

Yet, the 2025 phase underscored a new risk: crew safety during port calls in Yemen. The Ras Isa strike and others signaled that even ports in Yemen’s Houthi areas were now battlefields. Commercial ships generally had stopped calling at Houthi-controlled ports anyway (due to the longstanding Saudi-led blockade), but humanitarian vessels and smugglers did. After the Ras Isa bombing, humanitarian organizations briefly halted fuel shipments to Hodeidah for fear their tankers could be mistakenly targeted or caught in crossfire. This complicated Yemen’s already dire humanitarian situation. It also made neutral shipping (like UN-chartered ships bringing food) think twice, requiring clear coordination with the U.S. military to avoid any misidentification.

Overall Shipping Security by Mid-2025: By the middle of 2025, the immediate crisis had abated compared to the peak, but a new status quo prevailed in which heavy international naval patrols remained in the Red Sea as a deterrent. The Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea were effectively militarized waterways, with a semi-permanent presence of Western warships, maritime surveillance drones overhead, and occasional intercept operations (for example, boarding dhows suspected of carrying Iranian weapons to the Houthis, which the U.S. Navy did multiple times). Commercial shipping resumed near-normal patterns under this vigilant eye, but with the cautionary understanding that the threat could flare up again if the Houthis decided to retaliate anew or if a political trigger (like another conflict involving Iran or Israel) emerged.

The economic impact, while somewhat mitigated by mid-2025, left a mark. Businesses had incurred higher shipping costs that translated into higher insurance premiums and freight rates industry-wide. Some of those costs linger as insurers and shippers price in the risk of future instability. One positive side-effect, arguably, was improved international coordination on maritime security. The crisis pushed navies that don’t usually work together – from India to France to Saudi Arabia – to communicate and collaborate in the Red Sea. This could bode well for handling future threats like piracy or smuggling collectively. The Red Sea corridor might see new investments in surveillance infrastructure (there were discussions about putting more maritime patrol aircraft and drones in places like Djibouti or Saudi’s Red Sea coast permanently).

In summary, the U.S. military campaign and associated international efforts succeeded in largely restoring the security of shipping routes after an initial period of severe disruption. The flow of commerce through the Red Sea returned, preventing what could have been a major global economic shock had Bab el-Mandeb been effectively closed. However, the costs incurred during the period of instability were significant and served as a reminder of the vulnerability of maritime chokepoints. The shipping industry emerged more aware and better prepared, but also more wary. Strategically, the U.S. and allies achieved their goal of keeping the waterways open, validating the rationale for the campaign. The next section will situate these outcomes in the broader geopolitical context, examining how regional and global actors responded to this episode and what it implies for future policy.

Geopolitical Responses and Implications

The U.S. bombing campaign in Yemen reverberated across the geopolitical landscape, eliciting a range of responses from international actors and impacting the regional balance of power. In this section, we analyze how key stakeholders responded to the strikes and the Red Sea crisis at large, and we discuss the broader strategic implications of the campaign. Themes include the proxy dimensions of the conflict (U.S. vs Iran via the Houthis), the recalibration of regional alliances, and considerations for international law and military doctrine stemming from this intervention.

Iran and the “Axis of Resistance”: Iran, as the principal supporter of the Houthi movement, unsurprisingly condemned the U.S.-led strikes in vehement terms. Iranian officials framed the campaign as “American aggression against Yemen” and linked it to broader U.S. support for Israel. Tehran’s state media highlighted Yemeni civilian casualties and sought to rally regional public opinion against the U.S. action. However, Iran’s response was mostly rhetorical. Notably, Iran did not take direct military steps to intervene or escalate elsewhere in retaliation (for instance, there were no new Iranian attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq or Syria beyond the occasional harassment that had already been happening). This restraint suggested that Iran was cautious not to broaden the conflict – likely because the U.S. had communicated that the strikes were limited to maritime threat suppression and not aiming to overthrow the Houthis.

Strategically, Iran likely viewed the Houthi Red Sea campaign as a useful pressure point but not worth a direct war with the U.S. Thus, Iran’s support for the Houthis remained in the shadows: intelligence hints indicated Iran stepped up covert weapons shipments after the U.S. strikes (trying to replace some of the lost missiles/drones), possibly via Oman or via dhow routes. Iranian advisors in Yemen (from the IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah specialists) reportedly helped the Houthis adapt to the air campaign, advising on air defense and concealment. The proxy conflict aspect was clear: the U.S. was effectively degrading an Iranian proxy’s capabilities, and Iran was trying to patch them up, all while both sides avoided direct confrontation. This is a familiar pattern in the Middle East’s proxy wars (seen in places like Syria and Iraq as well).

Within the so-called “Axis of Resistance” – which includes Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, some Iraqi militias, and the Houthis – the Houthi actions and U.S. response were seen as part of the larger struggle against U.S. and Israeli influence. Groups like Hezbollah vocally supported the Houthis, and there were demonstrations in Lebanon praising the Yemeni “resistance.” However, these allies did not directly join the fray (Hezbollah, for instance, did not open a front against Israel in support of Houthis at that time, since they were already tied up in their own tensions with Israel post-Gaza war).

Gulf Arab States (Saudi Arabia and UAE): Saudi Arabia found itself in a complex position. On one hand, the Saudi leadership was undoubtedly pleased to see the U.S. finally taking on the Houthis, a foe that had plagued Saudi cities with missiles for years. The neutralization of Houthi maritime threats also protected Saudi’s Red Sea ports and its own shipping. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia had painstakingly negotiated a détente with the Houthis by 2023, including back-channel talks for a possible long-term peace in Yemen. Saudi officials feared that a too-forceful U.S. campaign could drive the Houthis away from the negotiating table and back into an aggressive stance toward Saudi territory. Riyadh’s official statements supported the goal of protecting shipping and condemned the Houthi attacks, but they were relatively muted about the U.S. strikes. Saudi Arabia offered quiet logistical support to the U.S. (allowing use of its airspace and perhaps sharing intel), but it did not publicly join the fray or announce its own strikes on the Houthis during this period. In effect, Saudi adopted a hedging approach: letting the U.S. bear the brunt of containing the Houthis in the Red Sea, while Saudi itself continued a diplomatic track to secure its border and end its direct involvement in Yemen’s war.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) had withdrawn most of its forces from Yemen in 2019 but maintained influence in the south of Yemen and strategic interest in Bab el-Mandeb (the UAE runs a base in Eritrea and had been linked to the development of the airstrip on Perim Island). The UAE strongly supported the U.S. campaign politically, seeing it as aligned with its interest in countering Iran’s allies and keeping waterways safe (Dubai’s economy, for instance, depends heavily on shipping). The UAE likely provided intelligence from its local networks and may have even aided target selection, especially since the UAE had excellent on-ground insights from its years in Yemen. Additionally, the presence of an airstrip on Perim (Mayun) Island could involve the UAE – many analysts believe the UAE built that airbase. If U.S. or allied planes used or planned to use Perim Island during the campaign, that would have involved UAE coordination. Regionally, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Iran (they both had diplomatic contacts resuming in 2023) was tested by this conflict, but since the conflict was framed around the Houthis’ wrongdoing (attacking ships), even Iran-friendly voices in the Gulf had to acknowledge the proximate cause was Houthi actions.

Israel: Israel was indirectly a central figure in this saga, being the reason the Houthis gave for their actions. The Israeli government quietly supported the U.S. strikes – they relieved pressure on Israel’s southern maritime flank. Throughout the Gaza war and after, Israel had one eye on Yemen, concerned that if the Houthis were not checked, they could land a lucky hit on a high-value target (for instance, an Israeli gas rig in the Red Sea or a populated area in Eilat). The Israeli National Security Advisor in late 2023 even warned that if the world did not act, Israel would have to act to remove the “naval siege” – which indeed Israel eventually did to some extent. When Israeli forces struck Yemen in 2024 (the few instances mentioned), Israel coordinated those moves with the U.S. to avoid collision or confusion. This coordination indicates how closely U.S. and Israeli strategic interests aligned on this issue.

One interesting geopolitical outcome is that the crisis fostered a sort of tacit cooperation between Israel and several Arab states that share an interest in Red Sea security (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.), despite those states not all having formal peace with Israel. There were likely intelligence exchanges and mutual maritime awareness efforts that included Israel – a mini case of how a common threat (the Houthis/Iran) can bridge differences. On the public front, Israel used the Houthi attacks to bolster its narrative that Iran’s influence was a menace across the region, not just to Israel, thereby justifying strong actions against Iran and its proxies.

Turkey and Others: Not all regional powers were supportive of the U.S. actions. Turkey, under President Erdoğan, criticized the U.S.-UK strikes. Erdoğan was quoted as saying Britain was turning the Red Sea into “a sea of blood,” indicating Turkey’s discomfort with Western military intervention in an Arab conflict. Turkey has pursued a more independent and at times populist foreign policy, often siding rhetorically with causes popular on the Arab street (like Palestinian support, which the Houthis claimed to champion). That said, Turkey did not actively counter the U.S. moves; its navy was not significantly present in the area aside from routine patrols. The Turkish criticism reflects the complicated politics: even if the Houthis were clearly endangering global trade, the image of Western powers bombing an Arab country carried echoes of past interventions that are unpopular in the region.

Qatar took a low-key stance, balancing its ties: it has good relations with Iran (and by extension some tolerance for the Houthis) but also is an ally of the U.S. Ultimately, Qatar offered diplomatic help by leveraging its contacts with the Houthis to probe for any dialogue, though nothing public emerged.

International Community and UN: At the United Nations, the Security Council (as noted) had initially endorsed action to keep the waterways open (Resolution 2722). After the U.S. strikes commenced, the Security Council did not authorize them per se – the U.S. justified them as collective self-defense of commerce and under existing UNSC resolutions on Yemen that demand Houthis cease attacks (which the Houthis violated). Russia and China, while abstaining on condemning Houthi attacks, expressed concern about heavy Western strikes. Russia’s position was somewhat restrained; although allied with Iran to an extent, Moscow did not approve of attacks on shipping (which affected Russian ships too) and Russia was distracted by its own issues (Ukraine). China, as a major trading nation reliant on the Red Sea route, was in a bind: it disliked U.S. military actions but benefited from the secured shipping lanes. China’s official line was to call for restraint on all sides and a return to negotiations, and it quietly pressed Iran to help rein in the Houthis. Both Russia and China likely appreciated that the U.S. was bearing the costs of a problem that, if left unchecked, would hurt their interests too. In fact, China had to evacuate some of its nationals from Yemen earlier in the war and had a vested interest in stability there.

Yemeni Actors: Within Yemen, apart from the Houthis, the internationally recognized government (the Presidential Leadership Council based in Aden) supported the U.S. strikes. That government, backed by Saudi Arabia, has been at war with the Houthis and saw the Red Sea crisis as further proof of Houthi recklessness. They framed the Houthis as not just a threat to Yemenis but to global security, hoping to gain international sympathy. However, that government is weak and had limited ability to contribute aside from granting diplomatic cover. Some factions in the south of Yemen (southern separatists) also supported any action against the Houthis, their northern adversary.

Unfortunately, the Yemeni civilian population in Houthi areas bore the brunt of the consequences: after enduring years of Saudi-led bombings, they now faced U.S. bombings. Anti-American sentiment likely grew in the Houthi-controlled regions as a result. The massive rallies in Sanaa after the initial strikes (organized by the Houthi authorities) demonstrated a surge of nationalism and defiance among Yemenis under siege. Slogans against the U.S. and Israel became even more entrenched in the Houthi rhetoric. This could have long-term implications: even if a peace is struck in Yemen’s civil war, a generation in the north has now directly experienced U.S. military force, potentially complicating future U.S.-Yemeni relations should a unified Yemen re-emerge.

Legal and Doctrinal Implications: The U.S. bombing campaign in Yemen without the host nation’s invitation (since the recognized government’s consent is somewhat moot given it doesn’t control the territory) and without explicit new UN authorization raises questions in international law. The U.S. justified it largely on collective self-defense (protecting commerce and partners from attack). This might set a precedent: can states use force in another country to protect an international common (like a shipping lane) when the threat emanates from non-state actors? It’s akin to anti-piracy operations, except here the non-state actor was an insurgent movement with territory. Many countries accepted the rationale due to the specifics (the UNSC had condemned the Houthis, and freedom of navigation is a widely supported principle). But some critics argued this was a slippery slope, potentially infringing on Yemeni sovereignty. Domestically in the U.S., the operation stirred debate about War Powers and congressional authorization. Initially, under Biden, it was limited and somewhat under the radar. Under Trump in 2025, it grew larger and attracted more scrutiny. Congress had not formally authorized hostilities against the Houthis. The administration argued existing AUMFs and the inherent right to protect U.S. forces and commerce sufficed. Nonetheless, some lawmakers questioned the open-ended nature of a campaign that was never publicly debated. This touches on a recurring issue: the U.S. engaging in conflicts against non-state actors beyond clear legal frameworks, something seen in the post-9/11 wars as well.

Military Lessons and Regional Security Architecture: Militarily, the campaign provided lessons on both sides. For the U.S. and allies: it underscored the importance of countering asymmetric threats to critical infrastructure (like shipping lanes) rapidly before they spiral. It validated the use of overwhelming initial force (the first strikes) to degrade an enemy’s capabilities – yet it also showed that determined insurgents can adapt and persist. The effectiveness of Houthi air defenses against drones taught the U.S. about the need for more resilient or stealthy ISR in such environments. The conflict also accelerated certain defense programs: for example, the U.S. began exploring ways to better protect large drones or to deploy lower-cost surveillance assets that wouldn’t be as painful to lose as a $30 million Reaper. On the naval side, it highlighted the value of having advanced warships on station (like the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers) with sophisticated radar and interceptors that successfully defended against Houthi salvos.

For the Houthis (and by extension Iran): the campaign provided a case study in how long they can harass a superior foe via asymmetric means and how best to survive a high-tech onslaught. The fact that they remained capable of firing missiles after hundreds of strikes is being analyzed in war colleges. It suggests that deeply buried infrastructure, camouflage, and decentralization work – tactics that other groups might emulate. Iran might take note that its investment in arming the Houthis yielded a strategic distraction that tied down U.S. assets for many months. Yet, from a geopolitical view, the Houthis also risked isolation: by attacking neutral shipping they alienated some international sympathy that they had as a beleaguered Yemeni faction.

Prospects for Resolution: By mid-2025, with the intense phase of conflict calming, diplomatic efforts were likely underway behind closed doors to forge a more permanent solution. Oman, a neighbor to Yemen and neutral mediator, may have stepped in to broker messages between the U.S. and Houthis. One could envision an unwritten understanding being sought: the Houthis cease all attacks beyond Yemen (no targeting ships or neighbors), and in exchange the U.S. ceases its bombing campaign. Indeed, after the late-April incidents and international criticism of civilian harm, there was pressure to move toward a ceasefire in the air war. If such an understanding took shape, it would be fragile and contingent on the situation in Gaza/Israel not reigniting to provoke the Houthis again.

Regional Maritime Cooperation: In the aftermath, Red Sea-bordering countries have an impetus to formalize a security mechanism for the waterway. There have been talks in the past of a “Red Sea Forum” or task force including countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, etc., to handle Red Sea issues. The recent crisis might accelerate those efforts, potentially in coordination with global powers. The U.S. might push for a standing maritime coalition specifically for Bab el-Mandeb security, which could reduce the burden on U.S. forces if regional players take more responsibility. However, including Yemen (or the Houthis if they become part of a future Yemeni government) in such an arrangement will be challenging given the animosities.

In conclusion, the geopolitical impact of the U.S. bombing campaign against the Houthis is multifaceted. It curtailed one proxy front in the Iran-U.S. rivalry but did not end it; it relieved immediate threats to commerce but underscored the ever-present vulnerability of global chokepoints; it united some unlikely partners in cooperation even as it drew criticism from others who saw another Western intervention in the Arab world. The campaign, by largely achieving its narrow aims, has possibly set a deterrent example—would-be aggressors now know that threatening world shipping can trigger a concerted military backlash. Yet, it also illuminated how entangled conflicts have become: a war in Gaza led to a Yemeni group attacking ships, which led to an American response in Yemen—a chain of events crossing regions. This interconnectedness means global and regional powers will have to think in a more integrated way about security.

The final section will conclude with reflections on the overall outcomes and lessons of the campaign, tying together the operational and strategic threads discussed.

Conclusion

The U.S. bombing campaign against Houthi targets in Yemen from 2024 into 2025 stands as a significant chapter in modern military and maritime history. What began as a localized rebellion in Yemen transformed into a conflict with global repercussions when the Houthis leveraged their position astride the Red Sea to strike at international shipping and foreign adversaries. In confronting this threat, the United States, along with key allies, conducted an extensive air and naval operation that showcased both the potency and the limitations of modern military power in addressing asymmetric challenges.

From a military studies perspective, several key conclusions emerge:

Operational Effectiveness vs. Asymmetric Resilience: The U.S. and allied forces demonstrated high operational prowess. They carried out a rapid, large-scale suppression campaign (notably Operation Poseidon Archer) that likely prevented the situation from escalating into an even more catastrophic closure of a vital trade route. The use of advanced assets—carrier strike groups, cruise missiles, stealth bombers—was effective in degrading the Houthis’ war-fighting capacity and limiting their reach. However, the Houthis’ asymmetric resilience meant that total elimination of the threat proved elusive. Despite over a year of on-and-off bombardment, the Houthis retained the ability to launch sporadic attacks. This underscores a broader lesson: air power and naval power, no matter how sophisticated, may not fully neutralize a determined non-state actor embedded in difficult terrain and willing to absorb punishment. The Houthis, similar to Hezbollah or the Taliban in other contexts, could absorb strikes, adapt by hiding and dispersing, and wait for opportunities to strike back on their terms. For military planners, this emphasizes the need for complementary strategies—diplomatic pressure, ground intelligence, perhaps even clandestine operations to target key nodes—that in tandem with air strikes can compel an adversary to stand down.

Strategic Deterrence and the Importance of Will: The campaign illustrated that demonstrating willpower is as important as demonstrating firepower. Early on, some analysts questioned whether the U.S. would really get “lured” into a war over ships and a conflict indirectly tied to Israel. Once the U.S. acted decisively, it sent a clear signal to the Houthis (and Iran) that attacks on international interests would not go unanswered. This likely had a deterrent effect; by mid-2024, the Houthis scaled back the frequency of attacks when they were reeling from losses. In 2025, when they resumed, the even fiercer U.S. response under Trump further reinforced that message. That said, deterrence was only partially successful—effective as long as the U.S. maintained pressure. The Houthis attempted to test and exploit any perceived lapses (for instance, during the lull between campaigns). Thus, sustained deterrence might require either continuous presence or a political settlement; the former is costly and the latter was outside military control. Nevertheless, the principle stands that resolute action in defense of shared interests (like freedom of navigation) garnered broad international backing and likely prevented greater conflict.

Impact on Maritime Security Doctrine: The events in the Red Sea may lead to doctrinal shifts or renewed emphasis in naval and joint operations. The U.S. Navy and its partners may invest more in counter-drone and counter-missile measures for protecting large areas at sea. The use of destroyers with Aegis systems to intercept Houthi missiles (essentially using them as a makeshift missile shield for commercial lanes) was innovative; future doctrine might formalize such tasks under concepts like “integrated air and missile defense for trade routes.” We may see increased development of convoy techniques and tech: for example, deploying drone ships or surveillance drones to scout ahead of convoys for threats. At the same time, the campaign highlighted the value of strong intelligence and coalition sharing. Intelligence from various sources—human spies, signals, satellites—was the lifeblood of targeting. One could conclude that Western intelligence penetration of Houthi networks was significant (judging by successes like hitting underground sites), but also that the fog of war persists (given tragedies like the misidentified migrant center). There will be lessons learned exercises to improve target discrimination and reduce collateral damage when striking non-state actors who intermix with civilian environments.

Humanitarian and Political Costs: The campaign’s toll on civilians, while not its focus, cannot be ignored in conclusion. The tragic strikes on Ras Isa port and the migrant detention center serve as stark reminders that even well-intentioned operations to protect global goods can inflict suffering on innocents. This not only is a moral concern but also a strategic one: such incidents risk undermining the legitimacy of the campaign and fueling the very extremism and anti-West sentiment that protracted conflicts tend to breed. For the U.S., this means future operations must continually strive for precision and accountability; and when mistakes happen, transparent investigation and mitigation (such as compensation or public apologies) are important to maintain international support. It also raises the question: could there have been alternative approaches to neutralize the Houthi threat with fewer civilian risks? Some suggest intensified covert ops or special forces raids on key Houthi leaders or sites might have supplanted some of the blunt-force airstrikes. However, those carry other risks and were likely deemed infeasible deep in Houthi territory. In any case, politically, the U.S. must grapple with the fact that it effectively opened another front in the Middle East, however justified, at a time when it has aimed to reduce military entanglements in the region. The conflict did not escalate to a quagmire, but it did become a sustained commitment that will figure into debates about U.S. presence in the Middle East going forward.

Geopolitical Balance and Future Stability: In Yemen, the net effect of the campaign is paradoxical. It protected the region’s sea lanes and thus indirectly helped Yemen too (preventing an all-out blockade that would have devastated Yemen’s economy further), yet it also deepened the divide between the Houthis and the outside world. In the near term, the Houthis have been militarily weakened in some respects – their advanced arsenal is diminished – but politically, they are probably more entrenched internally, rallying popular support against the U.S. “aggression.” This could complicate Yemen’s peace prospects, as the Houthis may be less inclined to compromise if they feel they emerged still standing after facing both the Saudi coalition and the Americans. On the flip side, the necessity of ending the airstrikes might push diplomatic creativity; perhaps a broader deal could be struck where the Houthis cease external attacks in return for something like partial sanctions relief or a role in a maritime security arrangement.

For the region, the episode reaffirmed alliances: the U.S.-UK partnership in action, the quiet Arab alignment with Israeli and Western interests against an Iranian proxy, etc. It also highlighted Turkey and others as voices of dissent, reflecting that Middle East politics remain heterogeneous.

Freedom of Navigation as a Red Line: Importantly, the crisis reasserted that freedom of navigation in international waterways is a red line for the global community. It hearkens back to historical precedents – like the U.S. reflagging tankers in the 1980s to protect them from Iran, or international flotillas fighting piracy off Somalia in the 2000s. The world’s economies are so interlinked that even a non-state actor in a poor country can send shockwaves by threatening a chokepoint. The decisive response in Yemen could deter similar tactics elsewhere. Potential adversaries will study how the Houthis were met with overwhelming force and may think twice about, say, closing Hormuz or blockading other straits unless prepared for full-scale confrontation.

In closing, the U.S. campaign in Yemen’s Red Sea theatre achieved its primary operational goal: ships today can sail through the Bab el-Mandeb with a far lower risk of attack than during the crisis peak. The strategic objective of preserving the integrity of a global trade artery was met, showcasing a successful case of international collective security action in a volatile region. However, that success came with complexities – the campaign did not solve the underlying conflicts (neither Yemen’s civil strife nor the Iran-Israel rivalry) and in some ways became entangled in them. It reminds policymakers that military power, while an essential tool, is not a panacea for deeply rooted political problems.

For future scholars and military strategists, this episode will serve as a rich case study. It blends elements of naval strategy, air power application, insurgency and counter-insurgency, and the geopolitics of proxy wars. It illustrates how 21st-century conflicts can sprawl across domains – from local grievances to cyber propaganda to the global economy. Most of all, it underscores the enduring importance of readiness and resolve in safeguarding the international system’s critical nodes. The Red Sea is a bit calmer now, but vigilance will remain the price of its security. The lessons learned in Yemen’s waters will undoubtedly inform how nations respond to the next unexpected threat to the shared maritime lifelines of our interconnected world.

Sources

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