U.S. Targets Chinese Shipping, Echoing Beijing’s Past Trade Tactics

In April 2025, the United States unveiled a bold maritime trade policy aimed squarely at China’s shipbuilding and logistics dominance. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced it would begin charging steep fees on Chinese-built and Chinese-operated vessels docking at American ports. The plan – initiated under the Trump administration with bipartisan support – is designed to “reverse Chinese dominance” in global shipping and send a demand signal for U.S.-built ships. Under the new rules, any ship constructed in China, or operated by Chinese firms, will incur fees based on tonnage or containers carried, up to a set number of port calls per year. The fees start at a modest level after an initial 180-day grace period, then rise incrementally in subsequent years. Notably, ship owners can earn waivers by ordering new vessels from U.S. shipyards, an incentive to shift business to American builders.

U.S. officials cast these port charges as a defensive move to rebuild an industry seen as vital for economic and national security. “Ships and shipping are vital to American economic security and the free flow of commerce,” said USTR Jamieson Greer, emphasizing that the policy will address threats to the U.S. supply chain and begin to “reverse Chinese dominance” in maritime trade. The USTR’s year-long investigation found that Beijing’s heavy subsidies and strategic plans for its shipping sector were “unreasonable” practices that burden U.S. commerce. By making Chinese-linked shipping more expensive, Washington hopes to level the playing field for domestic shippers and pressure Beijing to curb its maritime industrial ambitions.

Yet even as the U.S. breaks new ground with this tariff-like port fee on foreign ships, the tactic is strikingly reminiscent of trade measures China itself has used in recent years. Beijing has a well-documented track record of leveraging tariffs, port access, and other trade restrictions as strategic tools or retaliation in diplomatic disputes. The U.S. maritime fees of 2025 can be seen as a turn of the tables – borrowing from a playbook that China has employed against a range of countries. Below, we examine several historical cases where China imposed high tariffs, port hurdles, and import bans in pursuit of strategic aims, and how those actions parallel the current U.S. approach.

Beijing’s Track Record of Retaliatory Trade Measures

China’s rise as a trading power has been accompanied by a series of punitive trade actions directed at other nations when political disputes flare. Often couched in technical terms – such as anti-dumping rulings or health and safety concerns – these measures frequently coincide with moments of diplomatic friction, making their strategic intent clear. From steep tariffs on commodities to sudden customs holdups at ports, Beijing has repeatedly shown it is willing to weaponize trade to defend its interests. Key examples span multiple sectors and countries:

• Australia’s Exports – Tariffs Amid a Diplomatic Rift: In 2020, after Australia called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19, China swiftly unleashed a barrage of trade restrictions. It imposed crushing tariffs on Australian barley (an 80% tariff) and wine (up to 218%), ostensibly over dumping allegations, and unofficially halted imports of other goods like coal, lobsters, beef, and timber. Beijing denied the moves were retaliation, but the pattern was unmistakable: the barriers targeted billions in Australian exports as ties between Canberra and Beijing deteriorated. At the height of the standoff, shipments of Australian coal were left stranded off Chinese ports – hundreds of millions of tons stuck at anchor as Chinese buyers were directed to shun Australian suppliers. By choking off coal and levying punitive duties on farm goods, China sent a clear message after Australia’s political stance upset Beijing. The result was a deep freeze in trade. Australian industries from wineries to fisheries were hit hard, and Canberra launched cases at the World Trade Organization. (After a change of government, diplomatic dialogue improved and by 2023 China began easing these import curbs, lifting tariffs and bans as the relationship thawed.)

• Tit-for-Tat Tariffs in the U.S.–China Trade War: When the United States first slapped tariffs on Chinese products in 2018, China answered in kind, demonstrating its readiness to retaliate even against its biggest trading partner. Washington’s initial Section 301 tariffs – 25% duties on $50 billion worth of Chinese high-tech goods – were quickly met by Beijing with 25% tariffs on $50 billion of U.S. exports, targeting politically sensitive products like soybeans, automobiles, and airplanes. As the Trump administration escalated (eventually taxing over $500 billion in Chinese goods), China punched back with its own rounds of tariffs on a cumulative $110–$185 billion of U.S. goods. By late 2018, Beijing had announced new tariffs on $60 billion of American imports in response to U.S. measures. This tariff duel—each side raising import taxes on the other—mirrors in spirit the U.S. 2025 maritime fees on Chinese ships. In both cases, a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation unfolded, using trade costs as leverage. The U.S.–China trade war tariffs contributed to a significant chilling of bilateral commerce and higher costs for businesses globally, much as the new U.S. port fees threaten to add friction (and cost) to U.S.–China shipping.

• Europe’s Ordeal – From Lithuanian Blockade to Norwegian Salmon: Smaller countries in Europe have also felt the sting of Chinese trade retaliation. A striking case is Lithuania, which in 2021 angered Beijing by deepening ties with Taiwan. China responded with an unprecedented trade blockade against the tiny Baltic nation. In December 2021, Lithuanian officials reported that China had “stopped all imports” from their country – customs authorities in China simply refused to clear Lithuanian goods. Beijing even delisted Lithuania as a country of origin in its customs system, making it impossible for goods (even those from other EU countries containing Lithuanian components) to enter China. This economic chokehold was a dramatic show of force against an EU member, taken in retaliation for Lithuania’s Taiwan policy. It not only hurt Lithuanian exporters (lasers, food, furniture) but also put pressure on European companies with Lithuanian supply chain links. The European Union lodged a WTO complaint and scrambled to devise an “anti-coercion” tool in response. Similarly, a decade earlier, Norway saw its lucrative salmon trade with China dry up after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to a Chinese dissident in Oslo. Chinese authorities suddenly imposed onerous import controls on Norwegian salmon, citing health concerns, which caused Norwegian fresh salmon sales in China to collapse by over 60%. Tons of salmon rotted in Chinese warehouses as shipments were delayed or turned back. Although Beijing never officially admitted a link, the timing – right after the Nobel Prize controversy – made it clear Norway’s fishing sector was being pinpointed as payback. In both the Lithuanian and Norwegian cases, China used technical barriers (customs codes, inspections) as effective trade weapons to exert political pressure.

• Japan’s Rare Earth Shock: China has also leveraged its dominance in critical raw materials for strategic effect. Following a tense maritime incident with Japan in late 2010 (over disputed islands in the East China Sea), Beijing imposed an unofficial embargo on rare earth mineral exports to Japan, cutting off supply of elements vital for Japan’s tech industry. For nearly two months, Chinese customs halted rare earth shipments to Japan, sending prices soaring and spurring panic among high-tech manufacturers. This was a glaring example of China using its market power in a niche sector as a geopolitical tool – a move later dubbed the “rare earths weapon.” The embargo was never formally announced, and Chinese officials denied a targeted ban, but industry observers and the Japanese government had little doubt it was retaliation for the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain. The episode pushed Japan to diversify its rare earth sources and stood as a warning of China’s willingness to withhold critical exports when provoked. (Notably, more recently in 2023, Beijing has tightened export controls on advanced materials like gallium and germanium – again hinting it could restrict key supplies to Western industries if conflicts escalate.)

• South Korea – Tourism and Business as Pressure Points: China’s coercive tactics aren’t limited to tariffs and goods. In 2017, when South Korea deployed a U.S. anti-missile system (THAAD) despite Beijing’s objections, China unleashed a wave of informal sanctions targeting South Korean businesses and tourism. The South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group, which provided land for the THAAD battery, bore the brunt: Chinese authorities suddenly shut down 23 Lotte Mart supermarkets across China, ostensibly over “fire safety” violations. Within weeks, nearly 80 of Lotte’s 99 stores in China were forced to close temporarily by regulators. At the same time, Beijing effectively banned Chinese tour groups from visiting South Korea, devastating the Korean tourism industry which relied heavily on Chinese visitors. Popular Korean cultural exports (K-pop, TV dramas) were pulled from Chinese streaming platforms in an unofficial freeze. While not announced as formal trade sanctions, these measures were widely understood as retaliation against Seoul’s security policy. The impact was huge: Lotte eventually withdrew from the China market at a multi-billion-dollar loss, and South Korea estimated the THAAD backlash cost its economy billions in missed tourist revenue. This blend of regulatory harassment and consumer boycotts showed how China can exploit domestic controls to inflict pain on a trade partner – a parallel to how the U.S. now wields its domestic port regulations to affect Chinese shippers.

From high tariffs and import bans to port slowdowns and “safety” crackdowns, China’s menu of trade tactics has been expansive. The common thread is clear: strategic leverage. Beijing has repeatedly targeted the economic arteries of countries – whether a single commodity or an entire sector – to advance its political or strategic objectives. These cases demonstrate that China views access to its vast market (and its own role as a supplier) as a powerful diplomatic cudgel. It has not hesitated to use that cudgel in disputes over sovereignty, security alliances, or political values.

Strategic Parallels and Global Implications

There is an ironic symmetry now unfolding in global trade. The United States, long a champion of free trade (at least rhetorically), is adopting explicitly strategic trade measures against China – a page taken from China’s own playbook. By imposing port fees on Chinese vessels and contemplating tariffs on Chinese port equipment, Washington is effectively saying it will use its market leverage (access to U.S. ports) to achieve policy goals, much as Beijing has used access to the Chinese market as leverage over others. Both nations are increasingly willing to link trade with national security and geopolitical strategy.

The parallels are striking. Just as China’s high tariffs on Australian barley or wine were calibrated to pressure Canberra without formally violating trade agreements (citing dumping or quality issues as cover), the U.S. fees on Chinese ships are calibrated to pressure Beijing while technically falling within U.S. legal processes (a Section 301 investigation into unfair practices). And just as China dangled the prospect of lifting trade punishments when relations improved (as seen recently with Australia), the U.S. policy provides off-ramps (waivers for buying American ships) to coax behavior change. In both cases, economic interdependence is wielded as a weapon – a significant departure from the era when globalization’s premise was that interdependence would guarantee stability.

Global trading partners are watching these moves warily. China’s past retaliations have already spurred initiatives to reduce reliance on the Chinese market – from Japan’s rare-earth diversification to the EU’s new anti-coercion policies. Now, the U.S. stepping into more aggressive trade measures could further reshape supply chains and alliances. Countries in Asia, Europe and elsewhere may find themselves navigating between two economic heavyweights that are both using trade as an instrument of power. There are also risks to the global economy: when major players impose tariffs or block goods, it can drive up prices and disrupt supply flows. During the U.S.–China tariff war, consumers faced higher costs and companies had to reroute supply chains. China’s various embargoes and bans likewise caused market shocks (for example, rare earth prices spiked worldwide in 2010).

In the maritime arena specifically, the U.S. fees on Chinese-built ships could reverberate through the shipping industry. If Chinese shippers face extra costs, freight rates and insurance might adjust, and other countries could even emulate the approach for their own strategic ends. Some experts warn of a slippery slope: tit-for-tat restrictions can escalate, potentially fragmenting global trade into rival blocs. Beijing has sharply criticized the U.S. port fee plan, and while it has not (yet) announced specific counter-measures, it could retaliate in kind – perhaps by imposing its own fees or delays on U.S. carriers or by leveraging its control over key global ports and shipping lanes.

Ultimately, the U.S.’s 2025 maritime trade policy underscores a new reality: geopolitics are intruding into trade like never before. In a sense, Washington is acknowledging that pure free-market rules may need to be tempered when one trading partner (China) is perceived to exploit them for strategic gain. This mirrors China’s long-held view that economic tools are fair game in power politics. The world is witnessing a more muscular, transactional approach to trade from both East and West.

For better or worse, trade policies are now being used as sticks as much as carrots. The United States’ hard line on Chinese shipbuilding, coming after years of Chinese coercive trade tactics, feels like a culmination of mounting tensions. It is a journalistic déjà vu to hear American officials justify trade penalties in language similar to what Chinese state media might use to defend a tariff on Australian wine or a ban on Norwegian salmon – invoking sovereignty, fairness, and national resilience. As the U.S. and China trade places in wielding these economic weapons, global businesses and smaller nations find themselves bracing for volatility.

The strategic parallel is clear: whether it’s a fee on a cargo ship in Los Angeles or a pile of unsold barley in Sydney, both Washington and Beijing have shown they are ready to intervene in markets to achieve their aims. In this new era of great-power competition, ports, tariffs, and trade flows have become tools of statecraft – and the ripple effects will be felt across the world’s supply chains.

Sources:

1. USTR Press Release on Section 301 Action (Apr. 17, 2025) (US forges ahead with plans for steep port fees on China-built vessels | China | The Guardian) (US forges ahead with plans for steep port fees on China-built vessels | China | The Guardian)

2. The Guardian – US forges ahead with steep port fees on China-built vessels (Apr. 18, 2025) (US forges ahead with plans for steep port fees on China-built vessels | China | The Guardian) (US forges ahead with plans for steep port fees on China-built vessels | China | The Guardian)

3. Reuters – United States eases port fees on China-built ships after industry backlash (Apr. 17, 2025) (United States eases port fees on China-built ships after industry backlash | Reuters)

4. Reuters – Good progress on Chinese wine, lobster trade barriers: Australia (Mar. 10, 2024) (Good progress on Chinese wine, lobster trade barriers, says Australia trade minister | Reuters) (Good progress on Chinese wine, lobster trade barriers, says Australia trade minister | Reuters)

5. Wikipedia – Australia–China trade war (2020) (Australia–China trade war - Wikipedia) (Australia–China trade war - Wikipedia)

6. PRC Leader (Y. Huang & G. Slosberg) – China’s Response to the U.S. Trade War (2023) (China’s Response to the U.S. Trade War)

7. Wikipedia – China–Lithuania relations (2021) (China–Lithuania relations - Wikipedia)

8. The Independent (UK) – Norway’s salmon rot as China takes revenge for dissident’s Nobel Prize (Oct. 6, 2011) (Norway's salmon rot as China takes revenge for dissident's Nobel Prize | The Independent | The Independent)

9. CSIS – China’s New Rare Earths Export Restrictions (Jul. 2023) (The Consequences of China’s New Rare Earths Export Restrictions)

10. Reuters – South Korea’s Lotte reports store closures in China amid stand-off (Mar. 6, 2017) (South Korea's Lotte reports store closures in China amid political stand-off | Reuters) (South Korea's Lotte reports store closures in China amid political stand-off | Reuters)

11. Business Insider – China’s economic boycott over THAAD (Mar. 20, 2017)